In 2021, the Pakistan government intensified its efforts to control the media and curtail dissent. Authorities harassed, and at times detained, journalists and other members of civil society for criticizing government officials and policies. Violent attacks on members of the media also continued.
The authorities expanded their use of draconian sedition and counterterrorism laws to stifle dissent, and strictly regulated civil society groups critical of government actions or policies. Authorities also cracked down on members and supporters of opposition political parties.
Women, religious minorities, and transgender people continue to face violence, discrimination, and persecution, with authorities failing to provide adequate protection or hold perpetrators to account. The government continues to do little to hold law enforcement agencies accountable for torture and other serious abuses.
Attacks by Islamist militants, notably the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan, targeting law enforcement officials and religious minorities killed dozens of people.
Freedom of Expression, Attacks on Civil Society Groups
A climate of fear impedes media coverage of abuses by both government security forces and militant groups. Journalists who face threats and attacks have increasingly resorted to self-censorship. Media outlets have come under pressure from authorities not to criticize government institutions or the judiciary. In several cases in 2021, government regulatory agencies blocked cable operators and television channels that had aired critical programs.
Several journalists suffered violent attacks in 2021. On April 20, an unidentified assailant shot and wounded Absar Alam, a television journalist, outside his house in Islamabad. Alam has been a prominent critic of the government. On May 25, Asad Ali Toor, a journalist, was assaulted by three unidentified men who forcibly entered his apartment in Islamabad, bound and gagged him and severely beat him. Toor said that they identified themselves as being from a security agency, interrogated him about the “source of his funds,” and took away his cell phone and other electronic devices. The government ordered an investigation into the incident, but no findings were made public. On May 29, the news channel, Geo, “suspended” Hamid Mir, one of Pakistan’s best-known television talk show hosts, after he spoke at a protest in solidarity with Toor.
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) reported intimidation, harassment, and surveillance of various by government authorities. The government used the “Regulation of INGOs in Pakistan” policy to impede the registration and functioning of international humanitarian and human rights groups.
Freedom of Religion and Belief
Members of the Ahmadiyya religious community continue to be a major target for prosecutions under blasphemy laws as well as specific anti-Ahmadi laws. Militant groups and the Islamist political party Tehreek-e-Labbaik (TLP) accuse Ahmadis of “posing as Muslims.” The Pakistan penal code also treats “posing as Muslims” as a criminal offense.
According to a Pakistani human rights organization, the Centre for Social Justice, at least 1,855 people were charged under Pakistan’s blasphemy laws between 1987 and February 2021.
On May 17, dozens of people attacked a police station in Islamabad to lynch two brothers charged with blasphemy, breaking into the facility and battling with police officers before the station was brought under control. The two brothers were physically unharmed. The police arrested a number of individuals who were part of the mob, but none were prosecuted.
On June 4, the Lahore High Court acquitted a Christian couple, Shafqat Emmanuel and Shagufta Kausar, of blasphemy after spending seven years on death row. The couple was convicted in 2014 of sending “blasphemous” texts to a mosque cleric.
In August, an 8-year-old Hindu boy in Rahim Yar Khan, Punjab, became the youngest person to ever be charged with blasphemy in Pakistan after he was accused of defiling a carpet at a religious seminary. Following his release on bail, a mob attacked a Hindu temple, causing damage. All charges against the child were subsequently dropped.
Abuses against Women and Girls
Violence against women and girls—including rape, murder, acid attacks, domestic violence, and forced marriage—is endemic throughout Pakistan. Human rights defenders estimate that roughly 1,000 women are killed in so-called honor killings every year.
In July, the torture and murder of Noor Muqadam, 27, in Islamabad led to nationwide protests. A childhood friend of Muqadam, Zahir Jaffer, whose marriage proposal she had spurned, was arrested and charged with the murder. Earlier in July, Pakistan’s Parliament did not pass a bill that sought to criminalize domestic violence; women rights activists criticized the government’s decision to refer the bill to the Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) for review. The CII criticized the bill saying that it contained “un-Islamic injunctions” and would destroy the institution of the family.
In August, a viral video of a young woman being assaulted by more than 400 men in a Lahore park while she and her companions were filming a TikTok video led to domestic and international condemnation. The government vowed to find the perpetrators, but no arrests were made public.
Child marriage remains a serious problem in Pakistan, with 18 percent of girls marrying before age 18, and 4 percent marrying before 15. Women from religious minority communities remain particularly vulnerable to forced marriage. The government has done little to stop such marriages.
Pakistan ranked 153 out of 156 nations on the Global Gender Gap 2021 index issued by the World Economic Forum.
Children’s Rights to Education
Even before the Covid-19 pandemic, over 5 million primary school-age children in Pakistan were out of school, most of them girls. Human Rights Watch research found girls miss school for reasons including lack of schools, costs associated with studying, child marriage, harmful child labor, and gender discrimination. School closures to protect against the spread of Covid-19 affected almost 45 million students for most of the year; Pakistan’s poor internet connectivity hampered online learning.
Police and Security Forces Abuses
The Tehrik-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Al-Qaeda, Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), and their affiliates carried out suicide bombings and other indiscriminate attacks against security personnel that caused hundreds of civilian deaths and injuries during the year. In July, an attack on a bus carrying workers at the Dasu Hydroelectric project in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa killed nine Chinese engineers. In August, a grenade attack in Karachi killed 12 people, including six women and children. No group claimed responsibility for either incident.
Pakistan law enforcement agencies were responsible for numerous human rights violations, including detention without charge and extrajudicial killings. In March, Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan met with families of people who had been forcibly disappeared, allegedly by Pakistani security forces, and pledged that their concerns would be addressed. However, his government announced no investigations in any cases.
Pakistan has still not enacted a law criminalizing torture despite Pakistan’s obligation to do so under the UN Convention against Torture. In July, the Pakistan Senate unanimously approved a critically important bill outlawing police torture and otherwise seeking to prevent deaths in police custody. The law had not been passed by the National Assembly at time of writing. The law if passed would be the first time that Pakistan enacts a comprehensive definition of torture in line with Convention Against Torture. The bill also proposes criminal liability for death caused in police custody,
Pakistan has more than 4,600 prisoners on death row, one of the world’s largest populations facing execution. Those on death row are often from the most marginalized sections of society.
In June, the intergovernmental Financial Action Task Force (FATF) retained Pakistan as a jurisdiction under “Increased Monitoring”–a so-called gray list of countries that fall short of FATF standards for countering terrorism financing and money laundering. Pakistan has been on the gray list since 2018. The FATF noted that Pakistan had made progress by largely addressing 26 of 27 goals, but still needed to show that its investigations into terrorism financing and prosecutions “target senior leaders and commanders of UN-designated terrorist groups
In October, Pakistan’s Senate approved a bill that would decriminalize suicide; parliamentary approval was still pending at time of writing. Disability rights and mental health advocates welcomed the move as an important first step.
Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
Pakistan’s penal code criminalizes same-sex sexual conduct, placing men who have sex with men and transgender people at risk of police abuse and other violence and discrimination. In July, activists claimed that the transgender community in Karachi was being targeted in an organized social media campaign to instigate violence against its members. On April 6, a 60-year-old transgender resident of Karachi’s Korangi neighborhood was shot and killed by unidentified assailants who broke into their home.
Key International Actors
The European Union is Pakistan biggest trading partner. In April, the European Parliament passed a resolution deploring human rights violations in Pakistan and calling for an immediate review of Pakistan’s eligibility for GSP+ status, which grants Pakistan trade benefits conditional on its compliance with human rights obligations. In June, the EU and Pakistan held human rights talks. The EU’s report on Pakistan’s compliance with its human rights obligations to retain GSP+ status is scheduled to be published in early 2022.
In April, a ruling party member tabled a resolution in the National Assembly demanding a debate on whether to expel the French ambassador for “anti-Islamic” remarks made by President Emmanuel Macron.
In April, Pakistan secured membership on three United Nations panels: the Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, the Commission on the Status of Women, and the Commission on Population and Development.
Pakistan’s relationship with United States, the country’s largest development and military donor, remained volatile in 2021. The United States acknowledged Pakistan’s significant role as one of the stakeholders in resolving the Afghanistan conflict. However, in September, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said that the United States would reassess its relationship with Pakistan in formulating a policy on the future of Afghanistan. He also called on Pakistan not to recognize the Taliban government in Afghanistan unless it meets international demands. Pakistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs said Blinken’s remarks were “not in line with the close cooperation” between the two countries.
After the Taliban took control of Afghanistan in August, Pakistan signaled that it was prepared to recognize the Taliban government.
Pakistan and China deepened their extensive economic and political ties in 2021, and work continued on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, a project consisting of construction of roads, railways, and energy pipelines. In October, Pakistan carried out joint counterterrorism military exercises with China.
Freedom of Movement
Article 15 of the Constitution of Pakistan states that “Every citizen shall have the right to remain in, and, subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the public interest, enter and move freely throughout Pakistan and to reside and settle in any part thereof” (Devamithran June 1993, 37; see also HRCP Feb. 1998, 127). There are few legal restrictions on personal movement within the country1 (Country Reports 1997 1998, 1684, 85; Candland 6 Apr. 1998; Mahmood 30 Mar. 1998; Wright 7 Apr. 1998). Those restrictions which exist control the movement of individuals “on the ground of maintenance of law and order” (HRCP Feb. 1998, 128). The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) gives as an example the case of Qazi Hussain Ahmad, Amir of Jamaat-i-Islami, who in August 1997 was prevented from travelling to Khyber Agency on suspicion that he planned to hold a political rallya banned activity in the tribal areas (ibid. 129; see also Country Reports 1997 1998, 1684, 85). According to HRCP,
There were in addition the yearly restrictions placed during the [Islamic] month of Muharram by magistrates of potentially volatile areas against entry of named sermonists known for their tendency to stir sectarian sentiment. During 1997 about 400 such figures were banned entry by 14 different regions in Punjab and Sindh for two to three months. Sindh as a whole placed restrictions on 21 maulvis [religious scholars] of Punjab. In addition, Hyderabad headed off 14 others for two months (ibid.)
The Lonely Planet travel guide for Pakistan states that travel within the country is relatively easy and inexpensive, with frequent air connections between major centres (1997). Also, buses, vans, wagons, pick-up trucks and jeeps are plentiful for hire, and there is a train service linking major cities which are not in mountainous areas (ibid.). However, the travel guide issues a warning to foreign tourists: “With robbery, smuggling and gun-running amongst Sindh’s biggest industries, the province remains a highly dangerous place to visit.” It also recommends great caution when travelling throughout the rest of Pakistan (ibid.; see also U.S. Dept. of State 12 Dec. 1997).
A number of sources indicate that it is fairly common for people of means to buy or rent properties and move between cities in Sindh and Punjab provinces (Mahmood 30 Mar. 1998; Candland 6 Apr. 1998; Ahmed 1 and 6 Apr. 1998). Professor Theodore P. Wright, Jr. of the Graduate School of Public Affairs, State University of New York at Albany, who has researched ethnic relations in Pakistan, states that historically the main population movement has been from Punjab to Sindh province, Karachi in particular (7 Apr. 1998). During the latest period of military rule (1977-88) for example, many Punjabi army officers were posted to Karachi and put in charge of government offices and corporations (ibid.; see also Wright’s article in Comparative Politics Apr. 1991, 303). A large number of retired Punjabi army officers were given land grants near the Indus river, and many Punjabi businessmen have also gone to Karachi (ibid.). However, Professor Christopher Candland, a post-doctoral research fellow at the Department of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley, who researched the development of trade unionism in Karachi and who has recently returned to Pakistan for further research, comments that with recent violence in Karachi and Hyderabad in Sindh2 it is unlikely that large numbers of people would now want to move there from Punjab (6 Apr. 1998).
Saeed Shafqat cautions in Asian Survey that precise data on Karachi’s ethnic composition is not available, but estimates that about 60 per cent of the city’s population is Mohajir (July 1996, 670-71). Mohajirs are the largely Urdu-speaking population that left India during Partition (1947) and moved to Pakistan, many of them settling in Karachi and other parts of Sindh3 (Rizvi 1991, 36-37; Asian Survey Oct. 1996, 1036; Comparative Politics Apr. 1991, 300; Candland 6 Apr. 1998). The other 40 per cent of Karachi’s population is made up of Punjabis, Pathans, Baluchis, Kashmiris, Hazaras and Sindhis, with the latter estimated at less than 7 per cent (Asian Survey July 1996, 670-71). Shafqat comments that “despite chaos, turmoil, and violence, the city hosts an estimated half million illegal immigrants from Bangladesh, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Iran, Somalia, and some Arab countries” (ibid.; see also Urban Studies June 1992, 1150).
Sources point to a relative lack of movement from rural to urban Sindh, in large part reflecting the strong ethnic divide between rural Sindhis and urban Mohajirs (Candland 6 Apr. 1998; Urban Studies June 1992, 1150; Mahmood 30 Mar. 1998). Over the years, friction between Mohajirs and Sindhis over such issues as language, employment, nationalism and politics has exacerbated tensions in the province and contributed to a strong sense of ethnic separation (Comparative Politics Apr. 1991, 299-308; Mahmood 30 Mar. 1998; Rizvi 1991, 36-37; Asian Survey Oct. 1996, 1036-43). After language riots in the early 1970s, Mohajirs in rural Sindh moved in large numbers to such urban areas as Karachi and Hyderabad (Mahmood 30 Mar. 1998; see also Modern Asian Studies 1997, 192; Asian Survey Oct. 1996, 1032). Cross-migration of Mohajirs and Sindhis towards areas dominated by their own ethnic group increased after a series of ethnic killings by Sindhi and Mohajir groups in the late 1980s and early 1990s (Asian Survey Oct. 1996, 1033-34). Now, according to Candland, very few Sindhis from rural areas have the personal connections needed to establish themselves in Karachi (6 Apr. 1998). Nuzhat Ahmad of the Applied Economics Research Centre, University of Karachi, who studied choice of location and mobility behaviour of migrants in Karachi using socio-economic data from 1987-88, found that 38 per cent of newly arrived migrants settled in areas of their own ethnic background (Urban Studies June 1992, 1150). “Locating close to friends and relatives upon arrival may not only mean help in finding accommodation but also easier entry into the informal job market” (ibid.).
Several sources point to the high degree of ethnic segregation of neighbourhoods in Karachi (ibid., 1148; Mahmood 30 Mar. 1998; Candland 6 Apr. 1998; Wright 7 Apr. 1998). As Wright explains, after Partition the relatively small city was inundated with refugees from India, mainly Mohajirs and Gujaratis (7 Apr. 1998). Ethnically divided “colonies” (building settlements) were built, creating a ghettoized city (ibid.). In the newer colonies of Defence and Clifton, where the Bhuttos live, elite, moneyed groups have been able to build and settle regardless of ethnicity (ibid.). According to Wright, however, in middle and lower-class areas there is very little mixing, and when violence breaks out groups can attack an entire neighbourhood safe in the knowledge they are targeting one particular group (ibid.). Similarly, security forces have also been known to target particular neighbourhoods, as in 1995-96 when some 75,000 Urdu-speaking males were rounded-up in pro-Mohajir Qaumi MovementAltaf Hussain (MQM-A) areas (HRW Dec. 1996, 176; see also UN 15 Oct. 1996, 5). As well, recently there has been much public discussion of “no-go” areas in Karachi: sections of the eastern and central parts of the city4 which Altaf Hussain’s group, now known as the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM-A), claims are controlled by the rival Mohajir Qaumi Movement of Afaq Ahmed (Haqiqi faction MQM-H), and are closed to MQM-A members (PPI 14 Apr. 1998; The News International 17 Apr. 1998a; ibid. 14 Apr. 1998). In March and April 1998 the MQM-A threatened to pull out of its partnership with the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) in the Sindh government unless these areas were forcefully opened to MQM-A members (ibid.; The News International 17 Apr. 1998a; ibid. 14 Apr. 19985). However, after negotiations in London between the exiled Altaf Hussain and Sindh PML members, the Sindh government announced that no security operations would be launched to open up the “no-go” areas; the areas would instead be made accessible to all through unspecified “administrative measures” (Dawn 23 Apr. 1998). Candland reports from Karachi on 1 June 1998 that the “no-go” areas remain in the control of the MQM-H and closed to outsiders.
Several sources indicate that it is fairly common for people to move from urban Sindh to urban Punjab (Candland 1 June 1998; ibid. 6 Apr. 1998; Mahmood 30 Mar. 1998; Wright 7 Apr. 1998). According to Wright, members of the elite, who are able to speak English and have strong financial resources, face few problems moving and re-establishing themselves in another province of Pakistan (7 Apr. 1998). Wright also explains that Urdu-speaking Mohajirs from Karachi, who as a group tend to be very mobile, have no language problems in Punjab, since Urdu is the national language and many urban Punjabis understand Urdu (ibid.). Journalist and human rights activist Zafaryab Ahmed6 claims that many wealthy Mohajirs have successfully moved to Punjab to avoid Karachi unrest (1 and 6 Apr. 1998). Wright cautions that a Sindhi-speaking Sindhi would face language problems in Punjab, unless the individual is a member of the civil service and has been transferred to another post (7 Apr. 1998). In general, according to Wright, Sindhis are reluctant to leave Sindh (ibid.).
The ethnic segregation found in Karachi does not appear in Lahore, Punjab (Mahmood 30 Mar. 1998; Wright 7 Apr. 1998). Wright explains that at the time of Partition Lahore was already a large, established city, and most refugees who went to Lahore were Punjabi-speakers from India who integrated quickly. Thus today Lahori neighbourhoods are much more ethnically mixed than Karachi neighbourhoods (7 Apr. 1997).
According to Candland, in Pakistan political difficulties are often related to language and ethnic issues, but ethnic or language groups per se do not face oppressionmuch depends on personal political involvement (6 Apr. 1998). Candland reports that with vendettas being settled every day in troubled Karachi it is common for people to move away to escape potential political violence, but there is a strong belief among Pakistanis that “well-known figures with serious enemies” cannot find safety in other parts of the country (1 June 1998).
Khalid N. Mahmood, a public policy analyst and columnist for the Lahore daily The Nation, comments that violence in Punjab has been for the most part religious and political in origin, not ethnic, while Sindh has experienced a great deal of ethnic and political violence while so far escaping much of the religious violence experienced in Punjab (30 Mar. 1998; see also The Herald Apr. 1998b, 40-41).7
Language
Ethnologue (1996) lists 66 languages for Pakistan. Urdu, the national language, is the mother tongue of only about 8 per cent of the total population: 23 per cent in Sindh, but only 4 per cent in Punjab, although as noted above, according to Wright many urban Punjabis understand Urdu (ibid.; Pakistan Statistical Yearbook 1995, 66; CIA World Factbook 1997, Wright 7 Apr. 1998). Urdu is spoken by about 70 per cent of Karachi residents, while some 15 per cent speak either Punjabi, the dominant language of Punjab, Sindhi, from Sindh, or Pushto from North-West Frontier Province (Urban Studies June 1992, 1150). Sindhi is spoken by 52 per cent of the population in Sindh, but less than 1 per cent in Punjab, while Punjabi is spoken by nearly 80 per cent in Punjab and some 8 per cent in Sindh (Pakistan Statistical Yearbook 1995, 66). English, the language of the elite and of most government ministries, is spoken by less than 8 per cent of the population (CIA World Factbook 1997). Tariq Rahman states in Modern Asian Studies that even Pakistani nationalists who promote the use of Urdu often decide to educate their children in English so that they will have an advantage in domestic and international job markets, since English remains the de facto language of higher level schools, colleges, universities, and the more lucrative and prestigious professions (1997, 201).
Rahman explains that Urdu’s status as the national language has often been opposed by groups from the different provinces wishing to further their own language (1997, 179). Sources indicate, however, that Mohajirs have enjoyed a natural advantage in Pakistan through their majority use of Urdu, which is a second or third language for most other groups (Mahmood 30 Mar. 1998; Candland 6 Apr. 1998; Ethnologue 1996).
Employment
Wright explains that many ethnic groups in Pakistan believe they are victims of general discrimination even when they are in the majority or in a position of relative advantage (7 Apr. 1998). Sindhis, for example, although dominant in numbers in rural Sindh, have a low literacy rate compared to Mohajirs, and believe that they are discriminated against in employment in the civil service and armed forces, despite the system of regional quotas for civil service employment and educational positions that was set up to help economically backward areas such as rural Sindh8 (ibid.; Comparative Politics Apr. 1991, 303-305; Rizvi 1991, 37). According to Wright, Punjabis and Mohajirs deny discrimination against Sindhis, but Punjabis often stereotype Sindhis as lazy workers (7 Apr. 1998). Mohajirs, despite being a relatively well-educated group that dominates the economic and political life in Karachi, claim that the quota system discriminates against them (ibid.; Comparative Politics Apr. 1991, 305; Mahmood 30 Mar. 1998; Asian Survey Oct. 1996, 1038-39). Over the years Mohajirs have seen a loss of the advantaged position in the civil service that they enjoyed in the 1950s (Comparative Politics Apr. 1991, 300-301; Asian Survey Oct. 1996, 1039; ibid. Nov. 1995, 1008-09).
As a result of these and other grievances, both Sindhis and Mohajirs have experienced a rise in nationalist movements in recent years (Asian Survey Oct. 1996, 1038-39; Comparative Politics Apr. 1991, 299-308; Rizvi 1991, 37). In response some Punjabi leaders, while admitting the traditional dominance of Punjab in terms of population, government and representation in the army, have complained of reverse-discrimination resulting from government efforts to address Sindhi and Mohajir concerns (Rizvi 1991, 37; Mahmood 30 Mar. 1998).
The quota system for civil service jobs and entrance positions in professional schools such as medical and engineering colleges has been in effect in Pakistan since 1949, and was specifically provided for in the 1973 Pakistani constitution, with a 20-year time limit (Asian Survey Nov. 1995, 1012; Devamithran June 1993, 42; Dawn 23 Oct. 1997). After 1973 the urban Sindh quota stood at 7.6 per cent, a figure which Mohajirs have long felt was too low, especially since Karachi has grown substantially since the last official census in 19819 (ibid.; Wright 7 Apr. 1998). In April 1997 the Supreme Court ruled that the time limit had ended and that such quotas are now discriminatory and unconstitutional (DWS 17 Apr. 1997). On 9 March 1998 the Karachi daily Dawn reported that a “heated debate” on the future of quotas was continuing in the National Assembly, with the possibility that the government might pass a constitutional amendment providing for another ten years of quotas on the request of the smaller provinces (DWS 9 Mar. 1998). In the meantime the Lahore High Court has ruled abolishing nearly all quotas for entrance to medical colleges10, while the Lahore High Court has prevented the Federal Public Service Commission from holding its annual examination on a quota basis (DWS 26 Mar. 1998b; Dawn 23 Oct. 1997). In April 1998 however the Sindh Public Service Commission Pass Lecturers Association complained to the Chief Justice of the Sindh High Court that the quota system was continuing despite the legal rulings against it (The News International 17 Apr. 1998b).
Wright explains that in the relatively weak Pakistani economy, which suffers high levels of unemployment, hiring is often a question of who to favour rather than who to discriminate against, and most employers tend to hire people close to them: family members first, and members of their own ethnic group second (7 Apr. 1998). Employers, who have much greater control over relatives and others close to them, can refuse to set up an arranged marriage, for example, if the employee does not follow orders (ibid.).
According to Candland, Pakistan in general has quite a bit of labour migration, especially related to seasonal work such as harvesting, and in many cases people from one ethnic community do move to another province for better employment (6 Apr. 1998). Candland also explains that in some employment sectors an outsider might even have an advantage in winning a job due to discrimination against local people (ibid.). For example employers in the mining indistry will bring in workers from out of state and from other ethnic groups to work in mines. According to Candland, employers are better able to control these workers, and the workers are usually willing to work for lower pay than local workers. Also, in the case of a shutdown or restructuring, it is less likely that the local community would protest (ibid.). Candland gives as an example the coal mines around Hyderabad in southern Sindh where all the miners are Pashtuns from North-West Frontier Province who do not speak Sindhi or for the most part Urdu (ibid.).
Mahmood estimates that there is some level of ethnic discrimination against Urdu-speaking Mohajirs in Punjab, but not to the same degree as experienced by a religious group such as the Ahmadis, who are on a practical level barred from public service employment (30 Mar. 1998). According to Mahmood, this discrimination could make it more difficult for a Mohajir to find a job in either the public or private sectors in Punjab. However, pragmatism also comes into play: a Punjabi businessman, for example, might prefer to hire an Urdu-speaking Mohajir because Urdu speakers have a relatively high level of education and high literacy rate (ibid.). Thus, according to Mahmood, despite discrimination many Mohajirs do find work in Punjab because of their high skill levels (ibid.).
Candland reports that despite their grievances the Mohajir community is doing relatively well in comparison to other ethnic and languages groups, such as Bengalis and Makhranis (6 Apr. 1998). Makhranis are a fairly small group from southern Sindh and Baluchistan (ibid.). In Karachi, according to Candland, Makhranis usually occupy manual labour jobs, and like Bengalis face ethnic discrimination because of their low status on social, economic and educational fronts. According to Candland, it would be very difficult for a Bengali or Makhrani to win employment in a Karachi steel mill or in the public sector (ibid.). Candland also stated that Bengalis are still being deported from Pakistan to Bangladesh on the presumption that they are not “real” Pakistanis any more after the 1971-72 break-up of Pakistan and creation of Bangladesh (ibid.).
Education
According to Wright, education in Pakistan is very much dependent on social class (7 Apr. 1998). Among the elite English-speaking portion of the population, it is easy to find private English or Urdu schools, although there could be a waiting list for registration (ibid.; Mahmood 30 Mar. 1998). The public system is reportedly very poor throughout the country, especially in rural areas (ibid.; King and St. Vincent Apr. 1993, 37). The Lonely Planet travel guide states that primary education is available to only half Pakistan’s children, with only one-fifth going to secondary school (and two-thirds of these being boys) (King and St. Vincent Apr. 1993, 37). Mahmood estimates that due to government under-funding a family new to an area could well not be able to enroll their children in a public school for lack of space (30 Mar. 1998). According to Wright, government officers or company executives who are transferred could send their children to boarding school, although it would be expensive (7 Apr. 1998). Wright also explains that many middle class families are now putting significant resources into having their children schooled in English medium rather than Urdu or Sindhi (ibid.). Working class families cannot afford private school and usually their children do not get a good education (ibid.; Mahmood 30 Mar. 1998). Wright explains that this situation is consistent throughout Pakistan, however, so moving would not make things particularly better or worse (ibid.).
In Punjab, public school education is in Urdu throughout (ibid.). In Sindh, where language is a more explosive issue, Wright estimates that the language of instruction in rural public schools is probably Sindhi, while at religious schools (Madrassahs) the language of instruction is probably Sindhi and Arabic (ibid.). The pro-Sindhi Sindh Taraqi Pasand Party (STPP) is pressing for even greater use of Sindhi in Sindh schools (Dawn 27 Apr. 1998).
This Response was prepared after researching publicly accessible information currently available to the Research Directorate within time constraints. This Response is not, and does not purport to be, conclusive as to the merit of any particular claim to refugee status or asylum.
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Attachment
Research Directorate, Immigration and Refugee Board, Ottawa. June 1998. Map of Pakistan.
NOTES:
1. Exit Control Lists restricting the freedom to depart Pakistan are still in effect for certain individuals. For more information, please see Country Reports 1997 and HRCP’s State of Human Rights in 1997, pp. 127-28. Also, for information on freedom of movement within and to and from Azad Kashmir, please refer to the Research Directorate’s August 1997 Pakistan: Azad Kashmir and the Northern Areas.
2. For information on violence in Pakistan please refer to the Research Directorate’s October 1997 Pakistan: Chronology of Events March 1995 to October 1997 and June 1997 Pakistan: Update on the Mohajir Qaumi Movement (MQM) in Karachi (June 1997). Also, please see The Herald Apr. 1998a and Apr. 1998b.
3. Mohajirs are not part of a single ethnic community but, in the words of Moonis Ahmar in Asian Survey, “comprise various ethnic and racial groups having roots in the Indian provinces of Andrha Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal, and others” (Oct. 1996, 1036). Anthropologist Karen Leonard of the University of California, Ervine, points out that some portions of the original Mohajir community, such as Indian Hyderabadis, have in succeeding generations largely chosen to disassociate themselves from the Mohajir label (June 1997).
4. The Herald describes “no-go” areas as “Haqiqi strongholds in the city, which Altaf Hussain’s party workers cannot enter without risking their lives. These no-go areas included enclaves in Landhi, Korangi, Malir and Shah Faisal Colony, previously all MQM-dominated localities” (Apr. 1998a, 26).
5. See also Response to Information Request PAK29130.E of 9 April 1998 for additional information.
6. Zafaryab Ahmed, a journalist formerly with The News, is well-known for writing on social issues, including his 1995 reporting on the death of child labour activist Iqbal Masih (Ahmed 1 and 6 Apr. 1998; AI Oct. 1996; IFEX 9 June 1996). Ahmed is currently on bail awaiting trial for writing about this case (ibid.). For more information please see Amnesty International’s October 1996 report Journalists Harassed for Exposing Abuses and the International Freedom of Exchange (IFEX) 9 June 1996 Action Alert “Journalist Zafaryab Ahmed Detained.”
7. The MQM-A website lists monthly cases of reported human rights abuses against its members; the vast majority of the alleged incidents were reported as taking place in Karachi, with most of the allegations against the Haqiqi faction (MQM Jan.-Nov. 1997). According to the HRCP, politically motivated murders in Karachi more than doubled from 161 in 1996 to 385 in 1997, with 59 MQM-A members and 51 MQM-Haqiqi members killed in 1997 (as reported in The Herald Apr. 1998b, 40). The MQM-A also reports a 27 March 1998 raid on the MQM-A Lahore office by local police who arrested two MQM-A members and confiscated some MQM-A literature (27 Mar. 1998). The Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) website lists 82 alleged human rights abuses against its members (PPP 20 Feb. 1998). Most of these alleged cases involve relatives of Benazir Bhutto, high-ranking PPP members and/or former officials in the PPP government (ibid.), and in many of the cases individuals are reported to be in jail, on bail awaiting trial, or under police surveillance (ibid.).
8. Sindhis also have lingering resentment over several other issues, including the loss of their positions in urban Sindh largely to Mohajirs and the portioning of land in rural Sindh to Punjabis (Comparative Politics Apr. 1991, 301-303; Asian Survey Oct. 1996 1040-41).
9. A new census was held in late March 1998; results are not expected until June 1998 (DWS 26 Mar. 1998).
10. The exceptions were for tribal area students, disabled individuals and the children of teaching staff (DWS 26 Mar. 1998).